such as contract and tort law, are concerned but less so for constitutional and human rights law. In fact, in certain jurisdictions, among them Malaysia, Singapore, and the United States, some quarters are decidedly skeptical about the legitimacy of consulting comparative materials in relation to these latter areas of the law. In November 2005, U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales expressed concern over what he saw as the "growing tendency" of judges to interpret the Constitution by reference to foreign law, which, he said, might "undermine the long tradition of reverence that Americans have for the supreme law of the land." 2 This skepticism is curious, for it seems useful for a court to refer to foreign legal material-including cases, legislation, and academic writings-for several reasons. For instance, a court may use comparative material to shed light on the effect that should be given to the text of a bill of rights in its own jurisdiction, especially where the point has not yet arisen in the local context, or it is contended that previous interpretations are flawed. The reference may be fairly superficial; for instance, the experiences of foreign jurisdictions may be cited as indicative of international trends generally, or trends among established democratic nations, to support or disavow a particular approach taken by the court. Alternatively, a court may identify a doctrine of foreign law and apply it in articulating the meaning of the text of a domestic bill of rights, with suitable modifications if necessary. In addition, a court may find foreign law valuable not for its substantive content but for its general approach to the interpretive enterprise, enabling it to rationalize its own approach to interpreting its own country's bill of rights. This article examines why the use of comparative material for these purposes has been criticized as illegitimate. Specifically, four main concerns are dealt with.
The first is one based on the texts of bills of rights. Under this heading we will consider whether a court is justified in declining to consider comparative material on the ground that the text of a foreign bill of rights differs from that of the domestic charter. This concern has particularly held sway in the Commonwealth republics of Malaysia and Singapore. On the other hand, in the United States the principal concern appears to be that since a bill of rights reflects the identity and values of the nation, it is inappropriate to look to the experience of other countries. We will examine that concern, as well as two other concerns based on varying domestic conditions in different jurisdictions and the practicality of referring to foreign law. It is concluded that there are, in fact, sound justifications for courts taking a comparative approach to the interpretation of bills of rights. [T]he Constitution of Western Nigeria is now contained in a written instrument in which it has been sought to formulate with precision the powers and duties of the various agencies that it holds in balance. That instrument now stands in its own right; and, while it may well be useful on occasions to draw on British practice or doctrine in interpreting a doubtful phrase whose origin can be traced or to study decisions on the Constitutions of Australia or the United States where federal issues are involved, it is in the end the wording of the Constitution itself that is to be interpreted and applied, and this wording can never be overridden by the extraneous principles of other Constitutions which are not explicitly incorporated in the formulae that have been chosen as the frame of this Constitution.
Concern based on the text: The "four walls" doctrine
If Chief Justice Thomson's statement was to be understood in the light of Adegbenro v. Akintola, then Government of the State of Kelantan stands for the proposition that foreign principles of law should not be applied if they cannot be accommodated by the constitutional text. The rule ensures that the text is not ignored.
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Adegbenro v. Akintola, [1963] A.C. 614, [1963] 3 W.L.R. 63 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Nig.). 6 Id., [1963] A.C. at 631-632. differed even more widely from the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution.
Thus:
[i]n view of these differences their Lordships are of opinion that decisions of Indian Courts on Pt III of the Indian Constitution should be approached with caution as guides to the interpretation of individual articles in Pt IV of the Singapore Constitution; and that decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on that country's Bill of Rights, whose phraseology is now nearly two hundred years old, are of little help in construing provisions of the Constitution of Singapore or other modern Commonwealth constitutions which follow broadly the Westminster model. 11 Following this lead, the four walls doctrine has been applied in various Singapore cases. In Att , 12 the respondents, who were facing an action for contempt by scandalizing the court after the publication of a news article in the Asian Wall Street Journal, sought to rely on decisions from Canada and other Commonwealth jurisdictions relating to freedom of speech. The judge held that the Canadian decisions did not constitute useful authority "for they are decisions based on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which has no parallel in Singapore." 13 As regards the cases from other parts of the Commonwealth, the judge said that: though they make interesting reading, I find that so many of them turn on their own facts. As is to be expected, the judges in making their decisions in those cases were concerned with the social, political, industrial and other economic conditions prevailing in their respective societies at the particular time. It is therefore difficult to reconcile or to rationalize the many different and conflicting views expressed by the judges in their decision-making process. At best the cases only serve as illustrations of the application of the law of contempt in those countries. 14 In Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew, 15 a defamation case, the appellant invited the court to consider freedom-of-speech guarantees in bills of rights from jurisdictions such as Canada, India, and the United States, as well as article 10 11 [1981] A.C. at 669, [1980] [1981] argument by the appellant that was based on the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, Chief Justice Yong Pung How referred to the four walls doctrine:
There is a fundamental difference between the right to freedom of religion under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and art 15. The American provision consists of an "establishment clause" which proscribes any preference for a particular religion (Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion) and a "free exercise clause" which is based on the principle of governmental non-interference with religion (Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise thereof). Significantly, the Singapore Constitution does not prohibit the "establishment" of any religion. doctrine on the basis of differences in wording between the foreign bill of rights and the domestic constitution. Second, this dismissal is often buttressed by a declaration that foreign law is inapplicable locally because conditions in the two jurisdictions differ. If, as has been suggested above, 24 the four walls doctrine is essentially directed at preventing the constitutional text from being disregarded, the second feature is, arguably, an objection to foreign law that stands apart from the four walls doctrine.
That point, therefore, will be considered below, in section 3, of this article. The balance of this section will examine the first feature.
The four walls doctrine may be applied without much difficulty where the text speaks unambiguously. In Adegbenro v. Akintola, 25 for example, the main issue to arise was whether the governor of the Western Region of Nigeria was entitled to dismiss the respondent from the premiership without a vote having been taken, Victor Ramraj terms the four walls doctrine "legal rhetoric" and observes that it is routinely disregarded by the Singapore courts in practice. 26 interpretations based on the notion that relationships of genealogy and history, which tie certain constitutions together, offer sufficient justification for the importation and application of entire areas of constitutional doctrine. 28 In Singapore, for instance, it is common for courts to refer to Malaysian and Indian case law when interpreting the Constitution; the fundamental liberties in the Singapore Constitution were inherited from the Malaysian Constitution, which was inspired, in turn, by the Indian Constitution. 29 As an example, it was held in Kok Hoong Tan Dennis v. Public Prosecutor 30 that a legislative provision does not violate article 12(1) of the Singapore Constitution, which provides that "[a]ll persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law," if it passes the "rational nexus" test. This test requires the classification employed by the provision to be founded on an intelligible differentia that distinguishes persons grouped together from others left out of the group, and the differentia must have a rational relation to the end to be achieved by the law in question. In other words, there must be a logical nexus between the basis of classification and the purpose of the law. 31 Constitution: "The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India."
A genealogical interpretation appears to assume that if a local bill of rights was modeled on a foreign bill of rights, the legislature must have intended foreign legal doctrines to be applicable to the local context as well. However, unless there is evidence-such as reported legislative history-pointing to this conclusion, the assumption may not be justified. Rather, what a court should be asking itself is whether the concepts embodied in the text of a foreign bill of rights and the meanings that have been ascribed to that text are able to elucidate the content of corresponding provisions in the local bill of rights.
Neither has the four walls doctrine deterred Singapore courts from considering, both favorably and unfavorably, cases from jurisdictions other than Malaysia and India. In Peter Williams Nappalli before the High Court, 34 the judge, having referred to the doctrine with approval, went on to use foreign cases to buttress his argument, citing two U.S. cases, a Sri Lankan case, and an English case. On appeal, the Court of Appeal again invoked the four walls doctrine, and then proceeded to consider Australian, Philippine, American, English, and Canadian cases. 35 Indeed, it appears that the four walls doctrine is sometimes used as a device for rejecting certain lines of foreign authority while accepting others. better understand its own constitutional system and jurisprudence. 38 The court examines comparative case law and doctrine, not so much to gain an accurate picture of the state of the law in the other jurisdiction as to identify the assumptions that underpin it. The comparative jurisprudence serves as an "interpretive foil": in analyzing why foreign courts have reasoned a certain way, a court will surely ask itself why it reasons the way it does. 39 Having identified the assumptions underlying the foreign law and its own law, the court then faces a set of interpretive choices. If the court opts to reject foreign assumptions in favor of its own, the exercise is nonetheless bound to have heightened its awareness and understanding of constitutional difference, which, in turn, will shape and help guide the process of subsequent constitutional interpretation.
Conversely, if constitutional similarities are identified and embraced, dialogical interpretation grounds the legitimacy of importing comparative jurisprudence and applying it as law. 40 As a further possibility, a court may reject ingrained assumptions both in the foreign law and the law of its own jurisdiction and stake out a new interpretive approach proceeding from radically different premises, or determine instances of presumed constitutional difference to be unfounded. Thus, the process of dialogical interpretation "can lead the court to fundamentally re-assess its previous judgments, and to use comparative jurisprudence as a means to initiate radical legal change." 41 Foreign constitutional jurisprudence is often considered by Singapore courts dialogically, only to be ultimately rejected. 42 Ramraj acknowledges that it might be argued that such selective use of foreign constitutional cases is objectionable because the local court is employing these cases in support of its own position by taking them out of their legal and historical context. However, he says this misses the point: the dialogical approach merely uses comparative case law "instrumentally, as a means to stimulate constitutional selfreflection," 48 and does not purport to make normative claims based on the cases. 49 There is something to be said for judges using foreign material as a source of inspiration when considering how bill of rights jurisprudence should be developed; this is a point to which I return later. 50 Further, a key advantage of a dialogical approach is that it does not require the court to acquire a deeper understanding of the workings of a borrowed foreign legal doctrine and the role that it plays in the legal system from which the doctrine is derived. However, while in theory it is possible for a judge to refer to comparative material solely for instrumental purposes, in many cases it will be hard to imagine the judge does not have a preference for one line of authority over another. However, for a judge to act in this way would be undesirable, particularly if he neither articulates why obsolete legal principles are being applied nor provides convincing reasons why modern lines of authority have been rejected. A judgment that uses dialogical interpretation in this manner thus risks appearing arbitrary and illogical.
In summary, the four walls doctrine does not mandate a wholesale rejection of comparative constitutional material, as we have seen in jurisdictions such as
Singapore and Malaysia, which have repeatedly affirmed the doctrine but nonetheless drawn upon foreign law in genealogical and dialogical interpretations of their respective Constitutions.
However, both genealogical and dialogical interpretations have their weaknesses. Genealogical interpretation is legitimate provided there exists sufficient evidence that when the legislature imported the words of a foreign bill of rights into a local statute it intended also to import the meanings given those words by foreign judicial interpretation. Otherwise, a more sensible approach is for the local court to assess whether comparative material, whether or not originating from an "ancestral" bill of rights, is capable of illuminating the meaning of the local text. Dialogical interpretation appears to be conceptually acceptable, but judgments that refer to foreign cases out of context may come across as irrational.
The four walls doctrine should be understood, properly speaking, as a rule aimed at ensuring that a foreign legal principle is not applied when it cannot be validly accommodated by the text of a bill of rights. The doctrine, therefore, does not altogether exclude the use of comparative constitutional material. If this view is accepted, the difficulties with the genealogical and dialogical interpretations discussed above do not undermine the point.
Concern based on national identity
Skepticism has also been directed against the use of comparative constitutional material on the ground of what Mark Tushnet calls "expressivism"-the idea that constitutions help constitute the nation, to varying degrees in different nations, offering to each nation's people a way of understanding themselves as political beings. 51 Because a constitution is seen as embodying the commitments that define a national identity, this is said to speak against constitutional borrowing. 52
This was one of the main points made by the U.S. attorney general in his address at the University of Chicago Law School. Gonzales noted that the U.S.
Constitution was built upon the consent of the governed. When the Supreme Court held a law to be unconstitutional, it was vindicating the will of a sovereign people embodied in the written Constitution against the temporary expression of popular will manifested in the particular actions of a legislature. Therefore, he questioned how the standards of anyone other than the people of the U.S. could legitimately be relevant to determining the will of the American people. 53
The position is also exemplified in the views of Justice Antonin Scalia in [T]his Nation's evolving understanding of human dignity certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the values prevailing in other countries. On the contrary, we should not be surprised to find congruence between domestic and international values, especially where the international community has reached clear agreement-expressed in international law or in the domestic laws of individual countries-that a particular form of punishment is inconsistent with fundamental human rights. At least, the existence of an international consensus of this nature can serve to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American consensus. 71 Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia took exception to the reference to foreign and international legal materials. In his opinion, the majority's basic premise as he characterized it-that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world-ought to be rejected out of hand. He noted that, in many significant respects, the laws of most other countries differed from American law. This included not only explicit provisions of the Constitution but even many interpretations of the Constitution prescribed by the Supreme Court itself. 72 The Court either had to profess its willingness to reconsider all these matters in light of the views of foreigners or to cease putting forth foreigners' views as part of the reasoned basis of 70 Roper, id. at 1200. 71 Roper, supra note 67 at 1215-1216. However, as she did not believe that a genuine national consensus against the juvenile death penalty had yet developed, and because she did not believe that the majority's moral proportionality argument justified a categorical, age-based constitutional rule, she was of the view that the international consensus described by the majority could not be regarded as confirmation of the Court's decision: id. at 1215.
72 Id. at 1226. Scalia J. found the majority's particular reliance on the laws of the United Kingdom "perhaps the most indefensible part of its opinion." Taking a characteristically originalist viewpoint, he said it was true that the United States shared a common history with the United Kingdom, and that the Court often consulted English sources when asked to discern the meaning of a constitutional text written against the backdrop of eighteenth-century English law and legal thought. If the majority had applied that approach, it would have found that the "cruel and unusual punishments" provision of the English Declaration of Rights was originally meant to describe those punishments that were not authorized by common law or statute, but that were nonetheless administered by the Crown or the Crown's judges. Under that reasoning, the death penalty for under-18 offenders would have easily survived the present challenge: id. at 1227. its decisions. "To invoke alien law when it agrees with one's own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decision-making, but sophistry." 73 In his view the majority had relied on foreign sources, not to underscore the Court's "fidelity" to the Constitution, its "pride in its origins," and its "own [American] heritage," 74 but to set aside the centuries-old American practice-one still engaged in by a large majority of the states-of letting a jury decide whether, in the particular case, youth should be the basis for withholding the death penalty.
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It needs to be appreciated that, in determining whether a particular form of punishment is "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court has stated that it must consider whether there is a national consensus that laws allowing such punishment contravene modern standards of decency in the country. 76 This may explain to some extent why Scalia vehemently opposed references to foreign and international law in the juvenile death penalty cases: he believed that foreign law could have no bearing on the beliefs and practices of the United States. 77 But this does not explain his parochialism and opposition to comparative material in should be entitled to rely on comparative constitutional law as well. 79 More importantly, expressivism does not preclude the existence of constitutional norms that transcend national boundaries. In fact, it is apt to see domestic bills of rights as embodying universally shared norms. Lorraine Weinrib finds a nation-centric approach to constitutional interpretation to be incorrect. She sees in the rights-protecting instruments adopted in the aftermath of World War II a shared constitutional conception that, by design, transcends the history, cultural heritage, and social mores of any particular nation-state. The shared conceptual foundation of these instruments is to secure democratic government, the rule of law, and protection for equal human dignity. They require all states to treat everyone over 78 Tushnet, supra note 51. 79 Tushnet, id. at 1236-1237. See also Jackson, supra note 77, at 116-117 (if more than one interpretation of the Constitution is plausible from domestic legal sources, approaches taken in other countries may provide helpful empirical information in deciding what interpretation will work best; further, comparisons can shed light on the distinctive functioning of the domestic legal system); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Decent Respect of the Opinions of [Human] kind: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 64 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 575, 580, 584 (2005) (foreign opinions not authoritative, but "add to the store of knowledge relevant to the solution of trying questions," and since judges are free to consult other forms of legal commentary such as restatements of law, treatises, and law reviews, there should be no objection to them considering the analysis of a question contained in a foreign case as well). whom they hold power as ends, not means, and to respect both their full and equal humanity and desire for self-fulfillment. 80 She argues that a constitution, therefore, should not be interpreted with the stress laid on national consensus but, rather, in light of the shared conceptual foundation. Naturally, this approach embraces the use of comparative material.
Weinrib's view fits in with Choudhry's "universalist interpretation" of a constitution, although the latter does not identify any specific shared conceptual foundations. However, as Ramraj explains, a universalist interpretation involves an assumption that there exist constitutional norms that transcend jurisdictions; thus, the interpretation and articulation of these norms by one particular constitutional court can be drawn on by any other constitutional court. 81 It is very difficult to argue that there is no intersection of constitutional values across jurisdictions at all, and a minimal intersection is enough to justify the claim that a universalist approach to comparative constitutional jurisprudence is at least sometimes warranted. Once it is acknowledged that there are minimally some constitutional norms that transcend jurisdictions, this justifies a court in looking to foreign constitutional cases for assistance in understanding them. 82 In addition, if the potential existence of transcendent constitutional norms is accepted, a court is justified in looking to comparative material to search for them, whether or not such norms are ultimately uncovered. 83 80 Weinrib, supra note 57, at 15. See also Jackson, supra note 77, at 118 (individual rights embedded in national constitutions have 'universal' aspects, and foreign or international legal sources may illuminate these suprapositive dimensions of constitutional rights, as when constitutional text or doctrine requires contemporary judgments about a quality of action or freedom, such as the 'reasonableness' of a search or the 'cruelty' of a punishment). 81 grams of diamorphine into Singapore without authorization. The quantity of controlled drugs involved in the case was sufficient to trigger the mandatory penalty of death by hanging. The appellant challenged this on the basis that it would be contrary to the prohibition in customary international law against cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment, which was part of the "in accordance with law" requirement in article 9(1). 86 The Court agreed that it was widely accepted that the prohibition against cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment does amount to a rule in customary international law but found that the appellant had not shown a specific prohibition in customary international law against hanging as a mode of 87 Id. at paras. 91-92. In addition, it held that even if there were a customary international law rule prohibiting execution by hanging, the domestic statute providing for such punishment, that is, the Misuse of Drugs Act, prevailed in the event of inconsistency: id. at para. 94. 88 Note, however, the view taken that if the word law in the Constitution includes international law, it is only where the executive and the courts "agree" that a specific customary rule (which -25 -other transcendent norms in which the Court may be prepared to consider foreign materials that reveal how such norms are construed by other jurisdictions.
Although expressivism and universalism are not mutually inconsistent, they appear to pull in opposite directions. However, a balance may be struck between them, as is well illustrated by South African constitutional law. In 1994, the interim Hoyt Webb has theorized that South African courts, tribunals, and forums, which includes the Constitutional Court, were specifically enjoined to consider international law and permitted to consider foreign law, when interpreting the Constitution's bill of rights, because reference to external jurisprudence from "open and democratic" societies offered an appropriate method for assuring the public that the "Fundamental Rights" described in the [interim and final] Constitutions would be reasonably protected from future interpretational mischief or bigotry.
...
Given the uniquely terrible history of apartheid under which South Africa's legal and administrative systems were established to enforce and maintain the segregation, marginalization and minimization of the majority of South Africans of color, the framers of the IC [interim Constitution] wisely ensured that the standards applied to the construction of the post-apartheid legal system were not drawn from the same well, but from purer waters. 94 The operation of section 35 (1) 
Concern for differing conditions
We have seen that Singapore courts have, on a number of occasions, declined to consider comparative legal material on the basis, ostensibly, that social or other conditions in Singapore and the foreign country differ. Unfortunately, there is often no explanation in the holdings as to just how the conditions are different or why such differences are relevant. As Li-ann Thio has pointed out: "This perfunctory [waving] away of foreign cases on the basis of 'we're different' is undesirable. A focused elaboration of the different social conditions of these countries would aid in assessing their relevance to the matter at hand." 102 Nonetheless, the underlying concern is valid. A key reason for referring to comparative material is a perception that there may be a constitutional doctrine or mode of analysis originating in a foreign jurisdiction that is suitable for domestic application. However, the comparative material may not be appropriate if conditions between the domestic and foreign jurisdictions differ to such an extent that the foreign doctrine might operate unpredictably or detrimentally. Seth Kreimer cautions that there may be a "problem of translation": borrowing a foreign concept "yields no guarantee, or even likelihood, that the concept will mean the same thing to our courts that it does to its originators, or that the results reached in the [foreign] context will mirror the results the doctrine yields in its home arena, even if we were certain that those results were to be emulated." 103 It is also risky to predict the functioning of a legal doctrine in a new legal environment based on the way it functioned in the old one. 104 Admittedly, it is difficult to anticipate how a foreign legal doctrine will fare when applied in the domestic context. However, our concern over differing conditions may be assuaged by considering a distinction drawn by John Bell between legal transplants and cross-fertilization. 105 Transplants entail the transposition of a doctrine from one legal system to another. 106 There are doubts about the effectiveness of this process, about whether a foreign doctrine grafted on to a domestic legal system will "take" if it is incompatible with domestic circumstances. 107
On the other hand,
[c]ross-fertilisation implies a different, more indirect process. It implies that an external stimulus promotes an evolution within the receiving legal system. The evolution involves an internal adaptation by the receiving legal system in its own way. The new development is a distinctive but organic product of that system rather than a bolt-on. 108 Alan Watson points out that if what is sought in a foreign system is an idea that can be transformed into part of the law of one's own country then a systematic knowledge of the law or political structure of a donor system is not necessary. 109 In the same vein, the significance of differing conditions, social and otherwise, between the foreign and domestic jurisdictions may be downplayed. Thus, concerns regarding the operation of foreign legal doctrines in the domestic context may be addressed so long as such doctrines are not seen as potential material for wholesale transplantation but, rather, as inspiration for indigenous development in the domestic law.
In deciding Makwanyane, 110 the South African Constitutional Court gave consideration to whether the limitations clause in section 33 of the interim constitution 111 would uphold the validity of the death penalty, which had been found 107 See, e.g., Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 L.Q.R. 79, 81 (1976) : "Without hesitation one can accept the proposition that a foreign legal rule will not easily be borrowed successfully if it does not fit into the domestic political context. The word 'political' is used . . . with a rather wide meaning, with reference not only to the structure of government and governmental institutions but also to powerful organised groups. . . ."
108 Bell, supra note 105, at 147-148. 109 Watson, supra note 107, at 79. 110 Makwanyane, supra note 95. 111 Section 33(1) states: "The rights entrenched in this Chapter may be limited by law of general application, provided that such limitationa. shall be permissible only to the extent that it isi. reasonable; and ii. justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; and b. shall not negate the essential content of the right in question, and provided further that any limitation toi. a right entrenched in section 10, 11, 12, 14 (1), 21, 25 or 30 (1) (d) or (e) or (2); or to be cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment and thus unconstitutional.
Examining the interpretive techniques of the Supreme Court of Canada, the German Federal Constitutional Court, and the European Court of Human Rights, the Court found that limitations analysis typically consists of some form of a balancing test by which the courts review the means and ends of the offending legislation. 112 However, due to textual differences between the interim constitution, on the one hand, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other, the Court decided against directly adopting the tests used in those jurisdictions. 113 As for the proportionality test used by the European Court of Human Rights,
Chaskalson found it an unsuitable guide to the interpretation of section 33 because the South African Court is not under the same constraints as the European Court.
The latter is obliged to accommodate the sovereignty of its member states through the "margin of appreciation" doctrine, by which national authorities are allowed more discretion to contravene rights in areas concerning morals and social policy but less where a law seeks to limit a right fundamental to democratic society or interferes with intimate aspects of private life. 114 The chief justice proceeded to articulate a new test that involved the weighing up of competing values and, ultimately, an assessment based on proportionality that examined the reasonableness and necessity for the limitation of constitutional rights. 115
ii. a right entrenched in section 15, 16, 17, 18, 23 or 24, in so far as such right relates to free and fair political activity, shall, in addition to being reasonable as required in paragraph (a) (i), also be necessary Aside from the use of comparative material in legal cross-fertilization, there is a further point that follows from our consideration of transcendent constitutional norms. Ramraj argues that the existence of local, empirical conditions (social, economic, or historical) affecting the application of a general norm does not in itself present a challenge to comparative constitutional methodology or the universalist approach to foreign constitutional cases, if one accepts that at least some constitutional norms are transcendent. 116 In his view, whatever the peculiarities of the local conditions, the courts are nonetheless free and, he would argue, duty-bound to look elsewhere for transcendent constitutional principles to apply in a particular case. In doing so, they might well realize that not all local conditions are as special as they may seem initially. 117 In other words, the existence of differing social and other conditions in the domestic and foreign jurisdictions does not impair the use of comparative material in discerning transcendent constitutional norms. Once a norm is identified, if local empirical conditions are so peculiar as to warrant a departure from the common normative standard, then a duty lies on the court to show clearly what these conditions are and why they justify the departure. 118 Alternatively, it is justifiable to refer to comparative material eclectically in legal cross-fertilization, using it as a catalyst for an evolution of legal principles within the domestic legal system.
Practical concerns
In addition to the concern with principle, the consideration of foreign law in the interpretation of bills of rights can raise practical questions. These were invoked by 116 Ramraj, supra note 7, at 329-331. 117 Id. at 331-332. 118 Id. at 331. the U.S. attorney general when he commented in his November 2005 speech that the use of comparative legal materials presents "a problem of selection and at least the appearance of capriciousness." 119 In his view, if it is accepted that foreign law can properly be used in construing the Constitution, at a minimum it should be done in a way that comprehensively examines all relevant international sources. However, it may be impossible for even the most conscientious judge or lawyer to avoid being selective or arbitrary in the use of foreign law. 120 Further, even assuming that the necessary sources of foreign law can be gathered and translated, it would be an even greater task to understand and evaluate them fully. REV. 148, 165-166 (2005) (decision costs (time, effort, and expense involved in deciding cases in a particular way) and error costs (likelihood of making mistakes by pursuing a particular method) seem likely to be high for American courts dealing with foreign materials, given language and cultural barriers and most American lawyers' lack of training in comparative analysis the rule of law, and the protection of individual liberties; 129 the degree of similarity between the issues faced by the two systems; and whether sufficient foreign legal materials are available in a language that the judge and the parties are able to work with. It is only to be expected that the foreign jurisdictions most likely to be chosen are those whose courts have had more experience in dealing with complex constitutional issues, rather than distant lands whose laws are not well known.
Waldron's ius gentium theory limits the foreign laws that judges may consider to those that reflect a harmony of opinion among like-minded nations. Where such consensus can be found courts would do well to take it into account. However, the discretion of judges should not be unduly restricted in this manner. As explained in section 3, there is value in a cross-fertilization of ideas, in judges gaining insights from other nations' laws, and in using them to stimulate homegrown development in their own legal systems. To elaborate on Waldron's public health analogy, scientists
should not close their eyes to advances in other countries that have yet to be taken up in their own. As part of the scientific vanguard, they may play a significant role in creating a new consensus.
According judges a broad discretion to consider foreign laws may open them to the charge that the interpretive enterprise becomes, as Young puts it, "profoundly manipulable." 130 The charge seems to stem from the assumption that the range of comparative legal materials is so vast that, if judges hunt around diligently enough, they will be able to find support for any personal predilection. However, this 129 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 77, [125] [126] ractices of countries with commitments to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law roughly comparable to ours [the U.S.] are likely to have more positive persuasive value as to the empirical consequences of doctrinal rules, the legitimate justifications for government action, or the implications of basic constitutional commitments"). 130 Young, supra note 121, at 167. See also Gonzales, supra note 2, at 12: "[I]t cannot be expected that the laws of all sovereign nations-or, perhaps, even all the courts of a single nation-will agree on a disputed point of constitutional law. The decisionmaker will then be left somehow to choose among them. And this, of course, may lead to ... judicial activism or unrestrained judicial discretion. ..." presumes that there exists a precedent for every point of view under the sun-which, arguably, has not been proved. Besides, the onus would be on the judge to give sufficient reasons for justifying the reliance on a particular authority and why it should be accorded more weight than other local and foreign authorities that take a different point of view.
The difficulties of understanding comparative legal materials should not be exaggerated. As Young admits, the law engages virtually the full range of human activity; this means that courts must inevitably dabble in a wide range of disciplines in which they may lack specific training or expertise, including science and engineering in patent cases, and psychology in criminal cases. As in those instances, judges must simply be careful, articulate, and thorough when they cite foreign law. 131
The value of a comparative approach
This article has examined four concerns that have been raised to challenge the use of comparative material to interpret bills of rights. The first, reflected in the four walls doctrine, makes little sense if all it asserts is that foreign material is irrelevant because it is not based on the local bill of rights. Many courts, including those of Singapore and Malaysia, reject this flawed reasoning. These courts often refer to foreign material in interpreting domestic bills of rights, particularly when it originates from a legal system linked to the domestic one by ties of genealogy and history (a genealogical interpretation) or helps judges to better understand and express the assumptions behind their own reasoning (dialogical interpretation).
The four walls doctrine should be understood not as a general injunction against the use of comparative constitutional material but, rather, as a rule aimed at 131 Young, supra note 121, at 166. ensuring that a foreign legal principle is not applied when it cannot be accommodated validly by the text of a bill of rights. That said, the touchstone for considering comparative material is whether it is useful in explicating the local bill of rights. In this connection, it is interesting that the Privy Council no longer takes the narrow (and, in my view, incorrect) interpretive approach that it applied in Ong Ah
Chuan. 132 The issue raised in Reyes v. The Queen, 133 an appeal from Belize, was whether a mandatory death sentence imposed on the appellant was constitutional. In holding that it was not, apart from its own past decisions and those of the Belizean courts, the Privy Council referred to cases from Australia, Canada, the European Court of Human Rights, Guyana, Jamaica, India, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Mauritius, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Second, while a constitution or bill of rights may be seen as embodying the commitments that define a national identity, which should be shaped only by reference to homegrown beliefs and traditions, this view does not require a judge to eschew foreign law. Indeed, such comparative material may help one both to recognize and to shape the national identity of the country. Of greater significance is a perception that domestic bills of rights are best seen as incorporating universal or transcendent norms-they are, in this sense, specific applications of general principles. Given this is the case, comparative material enables such transcendent norms shared by different bills of rights to be sought and understood.
Third, the concern that foreign bill-of-rights material may be irrelevant to a domestic legal system-to the extent that local conditions, social or otherwise, differ from conditions in foreign jurisdictions-is minimized if we see foreign law as facilitating the organic development of domestic law, rather than as a source of selfcontained solutions to be transplanted into the domestic legal system. Further, the existence of transcendent constitutional norms necessarily implies the possibility of referring to comparative material. If a court perceives that local empirical conditions justify departing from a transcendent norm, then the onus lies on it to explain why this is so. It is not an injunction to shun foreign law altogether.
Finally, while the choice of foreign law references is necessarily subjective, and judges and lawyers may not be fully equipped to understand and evaluate comparative legal materials, it is hardly right to characterize the endeavor as capricious. The appraisal of foreign legal materials is arguably no more difficult than coming to grips with other areas of human experience of which courts and counsel have no specialist knowledge.
Meanwhile, the discussion in this article has hinted at some of the benefits of a comparative approach to interpreting bills of rights. I propose to highlight two of these. The first is that a judge who encounters a novel constitutional problem in his jurisdiction is not compelled to slash his own way through the undergrowth but, by referring to foreign material, can gain valuable insights into how other jurisdictions have framed the issues and developed solutions. which states: "No person shall be tried on any criminal charge save in due course of law." In dealing with this issue, two questions had to be answered: first, whether that guarantee included the right to be subject to penalty only in accordance with the law that existed at the time of a crime's commission, and, second, whether the impugned provisions of the Sex Offenders Act amounted to a criminal penalty.
As regards the first question, Geoghegan examined various cases from the United States and concluded that article 38.1 did indeed prohibit ex post facto criminal laws, particularly laws that would subject persons to punishments greater than those that existed at the time of their offenses. She said:
This conclusion I consider to be supported ... by the long standing view of the courts in the United States that the prohibition against ex post facto laws includes a prohibition against a law which increases the penalty after the date of commission of the offense. The unswerving acceptance of such a principle which has long historical origins supports the view that this is a long recognized and established right in relation to criminal trials in the common law world. 136 The judge again turned to U.S. cases to answer the question regarding the meaning of "penalty," observing strong similarities between the principles applied by U.S. courts, when considering penalties for the purposes of the prohibition against ex post facto laws, and the principles according to which Irish courts considered whether or not an offense was a minor offense and whether certain sanctions formed 135 IR. CONST., 1937. 136 Enright v. Ireland, supra note 134, at 331. part of the penalty or primary punishment for that offense. 137 Applying the Supreme Court decision in Kennedy v. 138 the judge held that the provisions of the Sex Offenders Act were not punitive in nature and hence upheld its constitutionality.
The case demonstrates how a court may benefit from the experience of a foreign jurisdiction by applying what was learned there to a novel issue that has arisen locally. However, the four walls doctrine and the South African experience show that a judge need not adopt the foreign legal principles wholesale-indeed, it would be wrong to do so-without closely examining whether these principles fit the text of the local bill of rights. It is helpful if we keep in mind three points that John
Allison has identified if cross-fertilization from one jurisdiction to another is not to degenerate into hazardous transplantation:
1)
The doctrinal ramifications-how domestic legal rules and doctrines might adapt to the external impetus and whether or how they will still fulfill the functions they were meant to fulfill.
2) How such adaptation might be justified in the legal and political theory or theories underpinning the legal system.
3) How domestic judicial (and, one might add, governmental and social) institutions and procedures might cope with the proposed doctrinal adaptation. 139 The second benefit of a comparative approach is that it ensures that important judgments concerning the fundamental liberties of individuals are made with an eye on evolving national and international standards. subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment there violates the European Convention on Human Rights. 143 The South African court concluded that these cases were consistent with the weight that the Constitution gave to the spirit, purport, and purposes of the Bill of Rights and the positive obligation that it imposed on the state to "protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights." 144 It agreed, therefore, with the applicant that his removal to the U.S. had violated the Constitution and granted various declarations sought by him.
It is proposed, here, that in Mohamed's case what the South African Constitutional Court did, in effect, was to identify a transcendent norm-namely, the prohibition against sending a person to another state where he is likely to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. As this norm was embodied in the Constitution, the Court was justified in considering the implications that foreign courts had ascribed to it. This is not to say that a domestic court may not refuse to follow the interpretations of transcendent norms prevailing in foreign jurisdictions. However, the fact that it proposes to depart from the practices of other democratic nations should give the court pause, implicitly asking it to consider why the laws of other nations have developed as they have and, further, to identify the material differences between those nations and the court's own jurisdiction that demand a different approach.
Returning to the quotation by von Jhering at the beginning of this article and extending the analogy: imagine the judge as a herbalist who seeks a cure for a constitutional ailment. To increase the chances of finding the right treatment for the 143 Soering v. U.K., 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989) patient, the sensible herbalist will gather a selection of herbs from a variety of locations. It is only prudent to scrutinize all the plants to determine whether or not there are any noxious weeds among them. However, once he has ascertained that a plant can indeed provide an efficacious cure, he would be foolish to reject it to his patient's detriment merely because it was not found in his own garden.
